360
30.6.2005
Press release issued by the Registrar
GRAND CHAMBER JUDGMENT JAHN AND OTHERS v.
The European Court of Human Rights has today delivered at a public hearing a Grand Chamber judgment[1] in the case of Jahn and Others v. Germany (applications nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01).
The Court held:
(The judgment is available in French and in
English.)
1. Principal
facts
The five applicants are all German
nationals living in Germany: Heidi Jahn and her brother Albert Thurm, were born
in 1947 and live in Sangerhausen; Erika Rissmann and her sister Ilse Höller
were born in 1942 and 1944 respectively and live in Erfstadt and Stotzheim; and
Edith Loth was born in 1940 and lives in Frankfurt an der
Oder.
The applicants all inherited land that had been allocated to their ascendants, subject to certain restrictions on disposal, following the land reform (Bodenreformgrundstücke) implemented in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany in 1945. The owners of the land redistributed under the land reform were called new farmers (Neubauern) at the time.
On
After German reunification, however, some
heirs – including the applicants – of persons who had acquired land under the
land reform were compelled to reassign their property to the tax authorities of
their respective Land without
compensation in accordance with the second Property Rights Amendment Act (zweites Vermögensrechtsänderungsgesetz) passed on
2. Procedure
and composition of the Court
The first application was lodged with the
European Commission of Human Rights on
In its Chamber judgment of 22 January
On
Judgment was given by the Grand Chamber of
17 judges, composed as follows:
Luzius Wildhaber (Swiss), President,
Christos Rozakis (Greek),
Jean-Paul Costa (French),
Georg Ress (German),
Nicolas Bratza (British),
Ireneu Cabral Barreto (Portuguese),
Corneliu Bîrsan (Romanian)
Volodymyr Butkevych (Ukrainian),
Nina Vajić
(Croatian),
Matti Pellonpää (Finnish),
Snejana Botoucharova (Bulgarian),
Elisabeth Steiner (Austrian),
Stanislav Pavlovschi
(Moldovan),
Lech Garlicki
(Polish),
Javier Borrego Borrego
(Spanish),
Khanlar Hajiyev (Azerbaijani),
Ljiljana Mijović
(Citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina), judges,
and also
Erik Fribergh, Deputy Registrar.
3. Summary
of the judgment[3]
Complaints
In the applicants’ submission, the
obligation on them to reassign their land without compensation in accordance
with the second Property Rights Amendment Act of
Decision
of the Court
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention
The Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, found that the interference in question had to be regarded as a deprivation of property and that it had been “provided for by law” in accordance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It also agreed with the Chamber’s opinion that the impugned measures had been “in the public interest”, namely, to correct the – in the view of the German authorities unfair – effects of the Modrow Law.
The question for the Court was whether a “fair balance” had been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s property rights. In that connection the Court reiterated that the taking of property without any compensation whatsoever could be considered justifiable under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in exceptional circumstances. It therefore had to examine, in the light of the unique context of German reunification, whether the special circumstances of the present case could be regarded as exceptional circumstances justifying the lack of any compensation.
In the first place the Court took account of the circumstances of the
enactment of the Modrow Law, which had been passed by
a parliament that had not been democratically elected, during a transitional
period between two regimes that had inevitably been marked by upheavals and
uncertainties. In those conditions, even if the applicants had acquired a
formal property title, they could not be sure that their legal position would
be maintained.
The Court also took into consideration the fairly short period of time
that had elapsed between German reunification and the enactment of the second
Property Rights Amendment Act. Having regard to the huge task facing the German
legislature when dealing with, among other things, all the complex issues
relating to property rights during the transition to a democratic, market-economy
regime, including those relating to the liquidation of the land reform, the
German parliament could be deemed to have intervened within a reasonable time
to correct the – in its view unjust – effects of the Modrow
Law.
Lastly, the Court held that the reasons for passing the second Property
Rights Amendment Act were also a decisive factor to be taken into consideration.
The FRG parliament could not be deemed to have been unreasonable in considering
that it had a duty to correct the effects of the Modrow
Law for reasons of social justice so that the acquisition of full ownership by
the heirs of land acquired under the land reform did not depend on the action
or non-action of the GDR authorities at the time. Given the “windfall” from
which the applicants had undeniably benefited as a result of the Modrow Law under the rules applicable in the GDR to the
heirs to land acquired under the land reform, the fact that this had been done
without paying any compensation had not been disproportionate.
In those circumstances and having regard, in particular, to the
uncertainty of the legal position of heirs and the grounds of social
justice relied on by the German authorities, the Court concluded that in the unique
context of German reunification, the lack of any compensation did not upset the “fair balance” which had
to be struck between the protection of property and the requirements of the
general interest.
There had therefore been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Article 14 of the Convention taken
together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
The
Court noted that the purpose of the second Property Rights Amendment Act of 14
July 1992 had been to correct the effects of the Modrow
Law in order to ensure equality of treatment between heirs to land acquired
under the land reform, that is, those whose land had been allocated to third
parties or returned to the pool of state-owned land in the GDR before the Modrow Law came into force and those who did not satisfy
the conditions for allocation, but in respect of whom the GDR authorities had
at the relevant time omitted to effect the transfers and enter them in the land
register.
As
the provisions of the Law of 1992 had been based on an objective and reasonable
justification, the Court concluded that there had not been a breach of Article
14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Judges Cabral Barreto and Pavlovschi each
expressed a partly dissenting opinion. Judges Costa and Borrego Borrego expressed a joint dissenting opinion joined by
Judges Ress and Botoucharova. Judge Ress expressed a dissenting opinion. The
opinions are annexed to the judgment.
***
The Court’s judgments are accessible on its
Internet site (http://www.echr.coe.int).
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The European Court of Human
Rights was set up in
[1] Grand Chamber judgments are final (Article 44 of the Convention).
[2] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17‑member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.
[3] This summary by the