558
20.10.2005
Two Chamber judgments concerning Bulgaria
The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following two Chamber judgments, neither of which is final[1]:
United
Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v.
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden
– PIRIN and Others v.
In both cases the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicants in the first case 6,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 800 for costs and expenses and the applicants in the second, EUR 3,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgments are available only in English.)
United
Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v.
The applicants are the United Macedonian
Organisation Ilinden (UMO Ilinden)
and its chairperson, Yordan Ivanov,
a Bulgarian national, who was born in 1932 and lives in Sandanski
(
UMO Ilinden is an association founded on
This case concerned the applicants’ complaints that the members and followers of UMO Ilinden were prevented from holding peaceful meetings on a number of occasions during the period 1998‑2003. The applicants relied on Article 11 (freedom of assembly).
The European Court of Human Rights found that there had been interferences with the applicants’ freedom of assembly concerning 12 events between March 1998 and September 2003 and no interference concerning three events during that period.
The Court accepted that those interferences were prescribed by law and that the bans were intended to safeguard one or more of the interests cited by the Bulgarian Government (protecting national security and the territorial integrity of the country, guaranteeing public order in the local community, protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder and crime).
Despite the Government’s assertion that, following the Court’s judgment in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, the authorities had undertaken measures to ensure the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of assembly, the Court noted that, with a few exceptions, the authorities persisted in their efforts to impede the holding of the commemorative events which UMO Ilinden sought to organise, much as they had during the period 1994‑97, when they had adopted the practice of imposing sweeping bans on Ilinden’s meetings. The Court further observed that the authorities’ justification for so doing was substantially the same and thus insufficient to make the measures in question necessary in a democratic society.
It was also noteworthy
that, on one of the occasions when they did not interfere with the applicants’
freedom of assembly (in August and September 2002), the authorities appeared
somewhat reluctant to protect the members and followers of Ilinden
from a group of counter‑demonstrators. As a result, some of the
participants in Ilinden’s rally were subjected to
physical violence from their opponents. The Court recalled that genuine,
effective freedom of peaceful assembly could not be reduced to a mere duty not
to interfere on the part of a State which had ratified the European Convention
on Human Rights; it was that State’s duty to take reasonable and appropriate
measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. The Court also
recalled that, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, political
ideas which challenged the existing order and whose realisation was advocated
by peaceful means had to be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through
the exercise of the right of assembly, as well as by other lawful means. The
authorities were therefore bound to take adequate measures to prevent violent
acts directed against the participants in Ilinden’s
rally, or at least limit their extent. However, it seemed that they, while
embarking on certain steps to enable the organisation’s commemorative event to
proceed peacefully, did not take all the appropriate measures which could reasonably
have been expected from them under the circumstances. The
Finally, the Court noted with concern, one of the bans was imposed, with almost identical reasoning, even after similar measures had been declared contrary to Article 11 in the Court’s judgment in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden.
The Court therefore
held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 11.
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and
Others v.
The applicants are: United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – Party for Economic Development and Integration of the Population (UMO Ilinden – PIRIN); Ivan Singartiyski, born in 1953 and living in Mosomishte; Ivan Bikov, born in 1938 and living in Samuilovo; and Atanas Orozov, born in 1948 and living in Razlog (Bulgaria). Mr Singartiyski, Mr Bikov and Mr Orozov, who are all Bulgarian nationals living in Bulgaria, were formerly the chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of UMO Ilinden – PIRIN.
UMO Ilinden –
PIRIN was a political party founded on
The applicants complained that UMO Ilinden – PIRIN’s dissolution was not prescribed by law or necessary in a democratic society. They relied on Article 11 (freedom of association).
The European Court of Human Rights found that UMO Ilinden – PIRIN’s dissolution did constitute an interference with its right of association. That interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting national security.
In considering whether dissolving the applicant party was “necessary in a democratic society” the Court noted that the interference in question was radical: the applicant party was dissolved with immediate effect. Such a drastic measure required very serious reasons by way of justification before it could be considered proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; it would be warranted only in the most serious cases.
The Court observed that the
The Court considered that it was not
unreasonable for the authorities to suspect that certain leaders or members of
the applicant party harboured separatist views and had a political agenda that
included the notion of autonomy for the region of Pirin
As regards the first
condition, it was noteworthy that on none of the occasions cited by the
Concerning the second
condition, the Court considered, even if it might be assumed that the political
project advocated by the applicant party was indeed the autonomy or even
secession of Pirin
Moreover, there was no
indication that the applicant party had any real chance of bringing about
political changes which would not meet with the approval of everyone on the
political stage. Indeed, it was recognised that the public influence of the
applicant party was negligible. It therefore appeared that the constitutional court’s
holding that the applicant party’s activity truly “imperil[ed] [
Considering that there
did not exist a pressing social need to order the applicant party’s dissolution
and that the dissolution was therefore not necessary in a democratic society, the
Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 11.
***
These summaries by the Registry do not bind
the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its
Internet site (http://www.echr.coe.int).
Registry of the European
Court of Human Rights
F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex
Press contacts: Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)
Emma Hellyer
(telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)
Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54)
Beverley
Jacobs (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)
Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91
The European Court of Human Rights was set up in
[1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17‑member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.
[2] in which it found a violation of Article 11 because the authorities
“resorted to measures aimed at preventing the dissemination of the applicants’
views at the demonstrations they wished to hold ... in circumstances where
there was no real foreseeable risk of violent action or of incitement to
violence or any other form of rejection of democratic principles”.